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1. Introduction 
After its election victory in 1997 Britain’s New Labour Government embarked on 
major reforms to the administration of fiscal policy. The government legislated for a set of 
principles to be applied when conducting fiscal policy. The principles are the backbone of 
the Code for Fiscal Stability1. One of the main arguments for reforms of this type is the need 
for macroeconomic policy to be sheltered from the myopic motives of political agents. The 
purpose of the present paper, in this context, is to investigate how political factors have 
shaped the long-run relationships describing the UK government’s provision of goods and 
services.  
We use the standard demand-side approach to modelling government expenditure 
that Borcherding (1985) described as the ‘fiscal everyman approach’. This approach, 
following the Downsian tradition, is based on targeting the representative voter-taxpayer’s 
preferences for publicly provided goods and services and has been used in previous 
empirical investigations of UK government expenditures by Tridimas (1992) and Ashworth 
(1995). These latter studies show that the preferences of the representative voter-taxpayer 
have had an impact on government expenditure growth but cannot tell us whether 
governments’ delivery of goods and services to the representative voter varies across the 
election cycle. We consider how election cycles affect the way in which incumbent 
governments target the representative voter-taxpayer’s preferences. Our concern is with the 
impact on UK government expenditures of the preferences of the representative voter-
taxpayer. We consider whether these preferences are consistently targeted across the 
electoral cycle and irrespective of the incumbent’s partisan (or ideological) persuasion.  This 
                                                 
1 For more details and an articulation of the Government’s perspective on its policy-making reforms attention 
is drawn to HM Treasury (2002). 
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departs from the reaction-function approach to modelling the impact of elections on 
expenditure behaviour2.  
We outline a theoretical framework that focuses on the adjustment of expenditure 
towards its long-run equilibrium, that is, the representative voter-taxpayer’s preferences. We 
consider the possibility that an asymmetry in the adjustment to equilibrium could result from 
either the time elapsed in the election cycle or the political parties. The empirical analysis is 
conducted using the cointegration tests with threshold adjustment as advanced by Enders 
and Siklos (2001). We use quarterly data to investigate adjustment to the equilibrium over 
the period from 1966 to 2002. The analysis focuses on exhaustive government expenditure3 
when considering the long-run equilibrium relationship for government goods and services 
in the United Kingdom.   
  The present analysis extends previous research in three respects. Firstly, we extend 
the standard demand-side approach to account for the effect of the time elapsed in the 
election cycle and political ideology on expenditure policy. We are able to assess whether 
the representative voter-taxpayer’s preference is paramount throughout the election cycle. 
Secondly, we focus on the adjustment of expenditure to disequilibria. In particular, if the 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is asymmetric. Expenditure policy, in a dynamic 
context, is modelled as a decaying deviation from the representative voter-taxpayer’s 
preferences. We consider the nature of any persisting deviation and its causes.  Is it the 
result of opportunistic or partisan behaviour? Finally, it focuses exclusively on the provision 
of goods and services by the UK government. Section 2 of the paper outlines the theoretical 
                                                 
2 This approach assesses the impact of elections on the responsiveness of government expenditures to a series 
of macroeconomic variables (see Tellier, 2003, for a recent survey).  In earlier research (Easaw and Garratt,  
1999, 2000), we adopted this approach when investigating UK expenditure cycles.   
3 Brown and Jackson (1990) use the adjective ‘exhaustive’ to differentiate between those expenditures that 
represent a claim on society’s resources (purchase of inputs) from transfers, which represent a redistribution of 
resources. 
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framework. This forms the basis of the empirical investigation in Section 3. It includes the 
results from the residual-based approach to cointegration under asymmetric adjustment 
presented by Enders and Siklos (2001) as well as estimates of asymmetric Error Correction 
Models (ECMs). Finally, the main conclusions are drawn in Section 4.   
 
2.  Theoretical framework 
     
The standard demand-function approach to modeling government expenditure on 
goods and services was initially designed to investigate the determination of local goods and 
services, but later adapted to national government expenditures.4 The demand-function 
approach is based on a representative voter-taxpayer’s set of preferences for government 
goods and services.5 Niskanen (1978) argues that the preference set can be depicted as 
lnQ = A+ηlnR +αlnY        (1) 
where Q is the quantity of government goods and services consumed by the average voter, R 
the perceived price paid and Y their real income6.  
Since Q, the amount captured by the representative voter-taxpayer, is unobservable it 
is necessary to use information about the quantity of goods and services produced for the 
population as a whole. The representative voter-taxpayer’s consumption of government 
goods and services is then determined as follows 
φ
XQ =
N
         (2) 
                                                 
4 See Brown and Jackson (1990, Chapter 5) for a summary of the findings from early empirical estimations of 
the demand for local services.  
5 For a presentation of the representative-voter approach to the modelling of social benefits, see Boadway and 
Wildasin (1989).  
6 Niskanen also included an unspecified variable to capture autonomous conditions affecting the demand for 
government goods and services. We do not include this variable here as any proxy would be ad hoc.    
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where X is the amount of the good or service provided for the population, N the size of the 
population and φ measures the rivalry in consumption of government goods and services, 
sometimes referred to as their ‘publicness’.   
The tax price per unit of government provision consumed by the representative voter 
when there are N voter-taxpayers can be written as 
CX TR = *
NQ E
         (3) 
where C is the average cost of the X units of the goods and services provided by government 
and T/E is the tax ratio measuring the proportion of this expenditure paid for out of taxation. 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue that budget deficits increase government spending 
because they reduce the perceived price of government goods and services to the current 
generation. This is justified in several ways, for example by assuming that voters heavily 
discount future tax liabilities or lack awareness of the extent of future tax liabilities. The 
latter issue was identified by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) in the context of the election cycle. 
Their model shows how governments in the run-up to national elections might attempt to 
signal their administrative competency by offering a bundle of goods and services that is not 
wholly affordable out of general taxation. Rational voters would not ordinarily support this, 
but with an appropriate lag structure the need for additional revenues only becomes apparent 
after votes have been cast. 
Following equations (1) to (3), we can write the total quantity of government goods 
and services as 
TlnX = A+αlnY +ηlnC+ηln( )+((φ -1)η+φ)lnNE     (4) 
Equation (4) is now the aggregate demand for government goods and services. When using 
national accounts data for empirical estimation the equivalent to X is exhaustive government 
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expenditure (EX) deflated by its cost (C). As Tridimas (1992) notes empirical work is 
interested in the real demand for government goods and services. Therefore, the income 
variable in equation (4) is the representative voter’s real gross income, y, while the real cost 
of the government’s provision of goods and services is the cost index of government 
provision relative to the index of prices, C/P. Finally, in abstracting in the presence of the 
provision of transfers, the taxation-financing variable is defined as taxation receipts net of 
transfers (NT) relative to exhaustive expenditure (EX). Therefore, the aggregate demand for 
government goods and services can be written as 
  C NTEXln( )= A+αlny +ηln( )+ηln( )+((φ - 1)η+φ)lnNC P EX      (5) 
Consequently, abstracting from the implied constraints on the parameters, we can estimate 
equation (6) and, hence, derive the long-run equilibrium of exhaustive expenditure. Wald 
Tests can then be conducted to test the restrictions on the parameters. 
 0 1 2 3 4C NTEXln( )= β + β lny + β ln( )+ β ln( )+ β lnNC P EX               (6) 
We now consider how short-run dynamics may affect this long-run equilibrium. To 
ease notation we use tZ  to depict the representative voter-taxpayer’s preferences and, hence, 
Equation (6) is re-specified as follows 
 t 0EXln( ) = β + βlnZC t              (7) 
Any divergence between government goods and services and the representative voter-
taxpayer’s preferences is assumed to be mean-reverting  
 ]λ +t 0 t t-1 0 t-1EX EXln( ) - β - βlnZ = [ln( ) - β - βlnZ τC C   1|| <λ        (8) 
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where λτ (1 - ) denotes the mean. From equations (7) and (8) we are able to derive the 
dynamics of the relationship between government goods and services and the representative 
voter-taxpayer’s preferences (see Appendix 1 for the derivation)  
   ( ]Δ t t t-1 0 tEX EXln( ) - βlnZ )= γ[ln( ) - β - βlnZC C -1
                                                
    (9) 
where γ . This suggests they co-move or are cointegrated over the long-run.   = (λ - 1)
The adjustment ( γ ) may be asymmetric. The asymmetry could arise due to either 
partisan (or ideological) reasons or proximity to elections7. Incumbents of different political 
persuasion may vary in the way they choose to adhere to the representative voter-taxpayer 
when providing goods and services. This could be driven by ideological motivations. 
Likewise, incumbents, regardless of their ideological persuasion, may choose to conform to 
the representative voter-taxpayer differently depending on the time elapsed in the election 
cycle. Opportunism may lead governments to adhere more closely to the representative 
voter’s preferences in the run up to elections (the pre-election period) than in the period 
following elections (the post-election period). Hence, the speed of adjustment of 
government expenditures to equilibrium in the pre-election period may be faster that in the 
pre-election period.8 The test applied to opportunistic theory focuses on the impact of the 
election cycle.  
We account for any asymmetric mean-reverting behavior, using a general 
specification as follows 
 
7 See Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) for specific opportunistic models, Hibbs (1992) for a review 
of the early developments in partisan theory and Andrikopoulos, Loizides and Prodromidis (2004) and 
references therein for a recent review of the political business cycle literature as well as empirical evidence 
relating to fiscal policy in the nations of the EU. 
8 Because UK governments can call an election at any time, provided it is within 5 years of taking office, the 
empirical analysis takes the post-election period to be of pre-determined length. Hence, the pre-election period 
will vary in length. 
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t t 1 t t-1 0 t-1 2 t t-1 0 t-1
EX EX EXΔ[ln( ) - βlnZ ]=γ I [ln( ) - β - βlnZ ]+γ (1- I )[ln( ) - β - βlnZ ]C C C  
           (10) 
where 1 2γ γ≠  and  is the Heaviside indicator function. Adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium may be either state-varying or depend on directional issues.  In the case of state-
varying behavior, the asymmetric relationship can be specified as a threshold autoregressive 
(TAR): 
tI
 
1  if   [ ] 0
0  if  [ ] 0
≥
=
<
t-1 0 t-1
t
t-1 0 t-1
EXln( ) - β - βlnZCI
EXln( ) - β - βlnZC
     (11) 
The adjustment depends on whether government expenditure is above or below the level 
that depicts the representative voter-taxpayer’s preferences. One may expect faster 
adjustment when government expenditure is below the representative voter-taxpayer’s 
preferences. Governments are more likely to rectify any shortfalls when meeting the 
representative voter-taxpayer’s preferences.  
The directional issues are accounted for using a momentum threshold autoregressive 
(M-TAR)  
1  if   [ ] [ ]
0  if  [ ] [ ]
≥
=
<
t-1 0 t-1 t-2 0 t-2
t
t-1 0 t-1 t-2 0 t-2
EX EXln( ) - β - βlnZ ln( ) - β - βlnZC CI
EX EXln( ) - β - βlnZ ln( ) - β - βlnZC C
  (12) 
If in the last period government spending rose relative to its equilibrium then the change in 
any divergence is positive. The change in the divergence is negative if there was a fall in 
government spending relative to its equilibrium in the last period. We assume the speed of 
adjustment differs between these two cases. One may expect greater momentum when 
government expenditure has risen. Hence, expenditure is downwardly rigid. The remainder 
of the paper investigates empirically the implications of the theoretical model. In particular 
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it is concerned with whether the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is affected by 
elections or political persuasion and, hence, opportunism or partisan behavior.  
 3. Empirical analysis 
Exhaustive government expenditure is expenditure on goods and services. It is the 
sum of the government’s final consumption expenditure and its capital expenditure. 
Between 1966Q1 and 2002Q1 the average growth in real government expenditure on goods 
and services was 1.5% per annum.9 Figure 1 shows the level and annual growth rate of real 
exhaustive government expenditure over this period10 
    Figure 1 [about here] 
Figure 2 shows the ratio of the exhaustive government expenditure cost index11 to 
the GDP deflator alongside the percentage of exhaustive expenditure that can be financed 
out of net taxation. The relative cost of government expenditure is seen to have increased 
over the period while the budgetary position has been more variable, but with the mid-1990s 
particularly notable for the weakness of the public finances when net taxation receipts 
covered only around 70% of total exhaustive expenditures.   
Figure 2 [about here] 
3.1 Testing for Cointegration with TAR and MTAR Adjustment 
   The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is first used to determine the order of 
integration of the variables in equation (6). The results are summarized in Table 1. All 
variables are found to be I(1), which allows us to proceed with a residual-based approach to 
testing for cointegration.  
                                                 
9 The average growth in total managed expenditure, which includes transfer payments, was 2.3% over the 
same period. 
10 All data is taken from Statbase provided by National Statistics and is available on-line at  
http://www.nationalstatistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdintro.asp 
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Table 1 [about here] 
The first step involves the estimation by LS of the long-run relationship for exhaustive 
government expenditure. Over the sample period 1966Q1-2002Q1 the following long-run 
equilibrium relationship is obtained (t-statistics in parentheses)  
ln(EX/C)t = 5.5499+ 0.39383 lnyt + 0.46638 ln(C/P)t – 0.19128 ln(NT/EX)t + 0.47448 lnNt  
                     (4.002)       (10.200)            (8.460)                  (-10.564)            (1.151) 
           (13) 
All the expenditure elasticities are found to be statistically significant with the exception of 
the population elasticity.12  The tax financing elasticity is seen to be significantly negative 
so that deficit financing increases the provision of good and services. Contrary to theory, but 
consistent with the finding of Tridimas (1992), increases in the cost of provision result in 
increased provision. Consequently, we are able to reject to the null hypothesis relating to 
equation (6) that 32 ββ = .13 But, further, we also reject the null hypothesis that the sum of 
the tax financing and cost elasticities is zero.14  Increases in the effective tax price have not 
deterred provision perhaps because the complexity of the taxation system makes it difficult 
for the public to accurately infer the effective tax price or because there are 
complementarities in consumption between goods and services provided privately and by 
government. Using the residuals we are able to estimate a model of the form 
                                                                                                                                                      
11 The cost index of exhaustive government expenditure is the weighted average of the deflators for 
government final consumption and investment. 
12 As can be seen below the estimated long-run relationship in the absence of population is fundamentally 
unchanged. The empirical analysis presented later in this paper was also conducted in the absence of 
population again with no substantive differences found. These results are available on request from the 
authors.  
 ln(EX/C)t = 7.1399+ 0.43474 lnyt + 0.45462 ln(C/P)t – 0.19742 ln(NT/EX)t   
                     (4.002)       (28.808)            (8.381)                (-11.394)      
  
13 The Wald Statistic for 32 ββ =  is 173.7248 (p=0.000) 
14 The Wald Statistic on the restriction that the sum of the tax financing and cost elasticities is zero, i.e.  
32 ββ −= , is 17.8303 (p=0.000). 
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∑Pt 1 t -1 t
i= 1
-iΔu = β u + γΔu       (14) 
Table 2 below gives the results of the residual-based cointegration test using both the Engel-
Granger and TAR models.15  
Table 2[about here] 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggests that a model using a single lagged change 
is appropriate, as shown in Table 2. The t-statistic for the coefficient on ut-1 is -3.7222. We 
are close to rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10% level.16  But, this co-
integration test is misspecified if adjustment to equilibrium is asymmetric. Following the 
method of Enders and Siklos (2001) we test for the possibility of asymmetric adjustment. 
Again using the residuals we estimate a Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model 
which takes the following form 
∑Pt 1 t t -1 2 t t -1 t
i=1
Δu = β I u + β (1 - I )u + γΔu -i     (15) 
where It is the Heaviside indicator function such that 
1=tI , if  01 ≥−tu
0=tI , if 01 <−tu         (16) 
When the threshold value is taken to be zero, 11 −ttuIβ  is the adjustment if last period’s 
residual is positive meaning that the government’s provision of goods and services is above 
the equilibrium level. The adjustment is 12 )1( −− tt uIβ  if last period’s residual is negative and 
the government’s provision is below the equilibrium level.  From the third column of Table 
2 we see that the point estimates of 1β  and 2β  indicate convergence. This suggests that we 
                                                 
15 The presentation of results follows that used by Enders and Siklos (2001). 
16 The critical Engle-Granger value at the 10% significance level is –3.83. 
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can use the F statistic, the test value of which is denoted as FC. The critical values reported 
in Enders and Siklos (2001) for the inclusion of a single lagged change indicate that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that 021 == ββ  at the 1% significance level (the 1% critical 
value is approximately 8.30). Since a cointegrating relationship exists the null hypothesis of 
symmetric adjustment 21 ββ =  can be tested using the Wald Test. The sample F value, 
denoted as FA, is 0.14641 and has a p value of 0.701, which means that at conventional 
significance levels we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment.  
We now consider whether the threshold depends on the previous period’s change in 
the residual. The implication is that the residuals have greater momentum in a particular 
direction. Hence, such models are referred to as momentum-threshold autoregressive (M-
TAR) models. The Heaviside indicator is set according to 
1=tI , if  01 ≥Δ −tu
0=tI , if         (17) 01 <Δ −tu
If in the last period government spending rose relative to its equilibrium then the change in 
the residual is positive. In this case adjustment in the latest period is 11 −ttuIβ . If, however, 
there was a fall in government spending relative to its equilibrium in the last period the 
change in the residual is negative and the adjustment in the latest period will 
be 12 )1( −− tt uIβ . The fourth column of Table 2 reports the results of the M-TAR estimation. 
The point estimates of 1β  and 2β  again indicate convergence. The FC value of 16.2296 
allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% level. Although the 
point estimates imply a greater persistence of disequilibria where government spending falls 
below its long-run equilibrium, the FA of 1.3302 means that we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of symmetric adjustment at the 10% level. 
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Following the method of Chan (1993) we are able to find the consistent estimate of 
the threshold parameter for the MTAR model. This is the threshold value that results in the 
lowest residual sum of squares. It is found to be -0.00265.17  The estimated M-TAR model 
using this consistent estimate is reported in the last column of Table 2.  The FC value of 
17.4057 indicates that we are able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. The point 
estimates suggest convergence such that the speed of adjustment for positive discrepancies, 
where , is more rapid than for negative discrepancies, where 
. The larger of the two t-statistics is
00265.01 ≥Δ −tu
00265.01 <Δ −tu 604.0− , which means that we cannot 
reject the null of no cointegration using what Enders and Siklos (2001) refer to as the t-
Max(M) test. But, in the paper they show that the t-Max(M) test has ‘low power’ and so 
conclude that they ‘cannot recommend using the t-Max(M) test’ (p.172).18  Therefore, since 
we are able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointergation we can test the null hypothesis 
of symmetric adjustment using the Wald Test.19 The FA value of 3.2692 has a p value of 
0.071, which means that we are able to reject the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment at 
the 10% level.  
                                                 
17 This equates to close on £1 billion (2001 prices) per quarter. During 2001, a change of this magnitude was 
equivalent to 2.1% of expenditure. 
18 Enders and Siklos (2001) note that the situation is quite different in the TAR model where ‘the power of the 
t-Max statistic is usually superior’ to the FC statistic ‘when the size of the test is 1% and there is a reasonable 
amount of asymmetry’ (p.171). 
19 Enders and Siklos (2001) face the same situation when analysing the Federal Funds Rate.  
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Following Enders and Siklos (2001, p. 174) who based their model selection on the 
AIC, we find that the momentum-consistent TAR model fits the data better than the other 
models in Table 2. Hence, there is greater momentum for quarter-on-quarter increases in 
exhaustive expenditures of more than £1 billion (2001 prices), relative to the equilibrium 
level. It displays downward rigidity. However, some caution should be attached to this 
interpretation since it ignores both the ideological persuasion of the governing party and 
time elapsed in the election cycle. These are issues we now address. 
Threshold Autoregressive Models allow us to consider whether the nature of 
adjustment to long-run relationships is state contingent. As outlined in the preceding section 
this approach is ideally suited to an analysis of the political system on government 
expenditure determination. We consider two possible ways in which politics might impact 
on fiscal policy. The first is a partisan or ideological effect. The second, which has tended to 
dominate the literature, focuses on electoral opportunism. The application of partisan theory 
in the current context involves considering the null hypothesis that the speed of adjustment 
of UK government expenditures during Labour (left of centre) and Conservative (right of 
centre) governments is the same. Consequently, the Heaviside indicator function is defined 
as 
1=tI , if  occurred under a Labour government 1−tu
0=tI , if  occurred under a Conservative government   (18) 1−tu
Table 3 [about here] 
Table 3 below outlines the relevant results. The results from the TAR model, which 
accounts for the partisan effects are presented in the second column of the Table. The point 
estimates of 1β  (Labour) and 2β  (Conservative) are consistent with convergence and the FC 
of 15.4162 indicates that the null hypothesis that 021 == ββ  can be rejected at the 1% 
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level. However, the FA value of 0.00051 means that we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis of symmetric adjustment at conventional significance levels. The speed of 
adjustment of government spending on goods and services to equilibrium is found to have 
been the same under Labour and Conservative governments. 
The test applied to opportunistic theory focuses on the impact of the election cycle. 
Specifically, it involves consideration of the null hypothesis that the speed of adjustment of 
government expenditures to equilibrium in a ‘post-election period’ of pre-determined length 
is the same as in the remainder of the election period or the ‘pre-election period’. This leads 
us to re-define the Heaviside indicator function as 
1=tI , if  occurred in a post-election quarter 1−tu
0=tI , if  occurred in a pre-election quarter    (19) 1−tu
The variable election cycle length in the UK does present problems for empirical analysis of 
this sort. Hence, our results should be viewed as illustrative of possible differences in post 
and pre-election expenditure behaviour by the UK government.20 We considered alternative 
lengths for the post-election period ranging from 4 to 8 quarters after each General 
(national) Election in the United Kingdom. The results are presented in Table 3. Of the 
alternative election cycle models, the AIC infers that the 6 quarter model type best fits the 
data. The point estimates of 1β  (post-election) and 2β  (pre-election) indicate convergence, 
while the FC  values allow us to reject the null hypothesis that 021 == ββ . Moreover, the 
FA value allows us to reject the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment at the 1% level. 
                                                 
20 The case of the two UK national elections held in 1974 (February and October) is one example of the 
problematic nature of applying the concepts of pre- and post-election periods to the UK. We have treated these 
2 elections as separate events. Hence, the post-election periods of these 2 elections overlap because of their 
close proximity in time.  
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The evidence points to the adjustment to disequilibrium being slower in the early part of the 
UK election cycle. The turning point is around 18 months after the national election.  
 
3.2 Asymmetric error correction models 
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimates of the error correction models which enable us 
to see if our findings are corroborated after information regarding the short-run dynamics is 
accounted for.  
    Tables 4 and 5 [about here] 
For completeness the estimates of the symmetric ECM are also reported in Table 4. The lag 
structure of the dynamic terms is determined by reference to the AIC. Across the models the 
short-run dynamics are statistically significant at the 10% level or lower with the exception 
of population whose long-run elasticity was also statistically insignificant. The short-run 
tax-financing elasticity is negative consistent with government using deficit financing to 
fund increased expenditure. In absolute terms the short-run tax-financing elasticity is larger 
than its long-run counterpart. The short-run cost elasticity is found be positive, as was the 
case with the long-run elasticity, and again contrary to expectation. But, the absolute value 
of the short-run tax-financing elasticity is found to be significantly greater than the short-run 
cost elasticity at the 10% level or lower. Therefore, in the short-run decreases in the 
effective tax price are attributable to increases in government spending on goods and 
services.  
The error correction models in Table 4 largely corroborate the earlier findings such 
that we are again unable to reject the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment at 
conventional significance levels for the TAR and MTAR models with zero thresholds. But, 
the error correction terms in the MTAR model using the consistent threshold estimate are 
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found to be significantly different at the 10% level. Convergence to equilibrium is faster for 
positive discrepancies from the threshold. Decreases in expenditures in excess of the 
consistent threshold (£1 billion, 2001 prices) are found to display greater persistence, as 
detected from the analysis of the residuals of the equilibrium expenditure relationship. 
Furthermore, based on the AIC, the MTAR error-correction model with the consistent 
estimate of the threshold is found to better fit the data than the TAR and M-TAR models. 
This too is consistent with those results from an analysis of the residuals. 
Table 5 confirms that there is no difference between Labour and Conservative 
governments in the speed with which exhaustive government expenditure converges on the 
long-run equilibrium relationship. However, the most significant finding is that the 
asymmetric adjustment of government expenditures to equilibrium across the election cycle 
is also evident once the appropriate error correction model is estimated. The AIC infers that 
the preferred political business cycle model, having incorporated the dynamics, has a turning 
point around 15 months after national elections, just a little earlier than was suggested by the 
analysis of the residuals. Up to this point disequilibria in the level of provision of goods and 
services have a significantly greater persistence than later in the election cycle. As the 
election cycle unfolds and the next election draws closer exhaustive government expenditure 
converges more quickly on equilibrium and so the representative voter-taxpayer’s 
preferences. The inference is that governments of all persuasions attribute increasing 
importance to preferences of the representative voter as an election approaches.  
Using the AIC21 to compare across the ECM models in Tables 4 and 5 we find that 
the preferred model of exhaustive government expenditure in the United Kingdom is the 
                                                 
21 The choice of the preferred ECM based on the AIC follows the approach of Enders and Siklos (2001, 
p.175). 
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opportunistic political business cycle model. Hence, the preferred model incorporates an 
asymmetric adjustment to disequilibria that is contingent on the point in the election cycle.  
 
3.3 Discussion of results 
The results provide further evidence that the long-run equilibrium of government 
expenditure in the United Kingdom is shaped by the preferences of the representative voter. 
Evidence of a co-integrating relationship between exhaustive expenditures and a series of 
demand variables demonstrates the importance of the representative voter on policy-making. 
Therefore, the long-run equilibrium can be labelled as Downsian since Anthony Downs 
(1957) predicted that political competition and the need to maximise votes would lead 
political parties to identify the preferences of the representative voter.  
Using threshold cointegration models we observe that the adjustment of exhaustive 
expenditures in the UK to the preferences of the representative voter exhibits asymmetric 
properties. The results show that this asymmetry occurs when converging on its long-run 
equilibrium; governments do not lose sight of their need to appeal to the representative voter 
at general elections.  
While the momentum of divergence can be shown to matter when modelling 
exhaustive government expenditure a better model fit is obtained when the residuals are 
assigned to one of two points on the election cycle. The adjustment of UK exhaustive 
government expenditure is significantly slower in a post-election period of between 15 and 
18 months after each general election cycle. The comparative speeds of adjustment in the 
post and pre-election periods can be viewed as indicators of the importance the government 
attaches to the preferences of the representative voter in these periods. The faster the speed 
of adjustment the more important is the representative voter. While expenditure convergence 
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is observed across the election cycle the representative voter’s preferences matter most in 
the latter part of the UK general election cycle, that is, prior to the next election.   
UK governments afford themselves most discretion in the earlier stages of an 
election cycle. Concerns about re-election are at their most distant and so convergence to the 
representative voter’s preferences is slower. However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
convergence is contingent on the political persuasion of the ruling government. Clearly both 
Labour and Conservatives are equally concerned about meeting the representative voter’s 
preferences. The discretion observed is opportunistic, borne out of the election cycle rather 
than political orientation.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper supports the political-economy view that account should be taken of 
political variables when modeling government expenditures.  Our contribution has been to 
offer new insights into how politics affects public spending in the United Kingdom. We 
have set out a testable theory of expenditure policy as a decaying deviation from the 
representative voter-taxpayer’s preference, which may be asymmetric. Using cointegration 
analysis with threshold adjustment, we have assessed the nature and cause of the divergence. 
We have found evidence that adjustment to equilibrium differs according to the direction of 
momentum and is contingent on the time elapsed in the election cycle.  
The detection of an asymmetric exhaustive expenditure policy has important 
implications for the way in which we model government expenditures.  Cointegration tests 
are misspecified if adjustment is asymmetric and asymmetries necessitate the estimation of 
asymmetric error correction models.  In assessing asymmetric expenditure policy, we find a 
more rapid adjustment to long-run equilibrium for positive changes where there has 
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occurred a quarter-on-quarter increase in exhaustive expenditures of more than £1 billion 
(2001 prices) relative to the equilibrium level.  We have also been able to attribute policy 
asymmetry to the point in the election cycle. The results indicate that there is greater 
persistence in the post-election period, while convergence of expenditure on equilibrium 
levels occurs more quickly in the run-up to elections. Model selection criteria favour the 
estimation of an asymmetric error correction model for exhaustive government expenditure 
in the United Kingdom, where the asymmetry arises out of the election cycle with a turning 
point around 15 months after the national election. 
Our conclusions support the idea that the representative voter-taxpayer plays an 
important role in influencing the UK government’s conduct of its exhaustive expenditure 
policy.  Policy decisions are made that enable expenditure levels to converge on 
equilibrium. However, the uncovering of asymmetric adjustment suggests that UK 
government affords itself some discretion in the provision of goods and services.  
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Appendix A1 
The long-run relationship is:  
tt ZC
EX ln)ln( 0 ββ +=               [A.1] 
with mean-reverting divergence:              
]ln)[ln(ln)ln( 1010 −− −−=−− tttt ZCEXZCEX ββλββ   1<λ    [A.2] 
where the mean is zero. Re-arranging the terms 
1100 )ln(lnln)ln( −− +−−+= tttt CEXZZCEX λλβλβββ    [A.3] 
Adding and subtracting 1-tlnZβ : 
110 )ln(ln)1(ln)1()ln( −− +−+Δ+−= tttt CEXZZCEX λβλββλ   [A.4] 
Subtracting 1)ln( −tC
EX  from both sides; 
110 )ln()1(ln)1(ln)1()ln( −− −−−+Δ+−=Δ tttt CEXZZCEX λβλββλ    [A.5] 
 or alternatively, 
tttt ZZC
EX
C
EX ln]ln))[ln(1()ln( 101 Δ+−−−=Δ −− βββλ     [A.6] 
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Figure 1: UK exhaustive government expenditure, level and annual growth rate, 
1966Q1 – 2002Q1, quarterly 
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         Source: Blue Book, Office for National Statistics 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of exhaustive expenditure financed out of net taxation and 
relative cost of exhaustive expenditure, 1966Q1 – 2002Q1, quarterly 
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 Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
(sample 1966Q1 – 2002Q1, quarterly) 
Variable ADF( p,t) I(1)/I(0) ADF( p,t) I(2)/(1)
ln(EX/C) -2.6456 (1,1) -13.8674 (0,0)
ln(C/P) -1.7410 (1,0) -15.7397 (0,0)
Lny -2.1836 (1,1) -12.3249 (2,0)
ln(NT/EX) -2.4388 (6,0) -4.5747 (5,0)
lnN 0.00452 (3,0) -4.5464 (2,0)
ADF test includes a constant. Null hypothesis is non-stationary series. p is the number of lagged changes used 
in the ADF test and t indicates whether a time trend is included. SBC is used in determining preferred 
specification. The 5% critical value in the absence of a time trend is -2.8815 and -3.4415 in the presence of a 
time trend.  
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Table 2: Estimates of exhaustive government expenditure residuals 
(sample 1966Q1 – 2002Q1, quarterly) 
 Symmetric 
convergence Asymmetric convergence 
 Engle-Granger Threshold Momentum Momentum-consistent
1β  a -0.20609 
(-3.722) 
-0.18130
(-2.124)
-0.26803
(-3.481)
-0.26890
(-4.1372)
2β  a NA -0.22229
(-3.184)
-0.14689
(-1.949)
-0.059199
(-0.604)
1γ  a -0.21991 (-2.746) -0.22172(-2.756) -0.22449(-2.803) -0.20440(-2.558)
AIC 440.1683 439.2430 439.8476 440.8186
FC b NA 15.5053 16.2296 17.4057
FA c NA 0.14641
(0.702)
1.3301
(0.249)
3.2692
(0.071)
a In parentheses are the t-statistics 
b F-statistic for null hypothesis that the coefficients on the regressors are zero (no cointegrating relationship) 
c Wald Statistic for null hypothesis that 21 ββ = (symmetric adjustment). P value in parentheses 
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Table 3: Estimates of exhaustive government expenditure residuals  
(sample 1966Q1–2002Q1, quarterly) 
Election cycle 
 
Partisan
4 quarters 5 quarters 6 quarters 7 quarters 8 quarters
1β a -0.20555
(-2.194)
-0.064312
(-0.722)
-0.045591
(-0.558)
-0.061408
(-0.816)
-0.11876 
(-1.662) 
-0.14120
(-2.044)
2β a -0.20637
(-3.029)
-0.28728
(-4.226)
-0.32359
(-4.602)
-0.34855
(-4.666)
-0.32021 
(-3.944) 
-0.30780
(-3.603)
1γ a -0.21981(-2.693) -0.19624(-2.450) -0.19045(-2.402) -0.18606(-2.348) -0.19313 (-2.397) -0.20045(-2.485)
AIC 439.1684 441.2177 442.6087 442.9761 441.0021 440.3964
FC b 15.4162 17.8937 19.6158 20.0761 17.6297 16.8924
FA c 0.00051
(0.994)
4.0712
(0.044)
6.9008
(0.009)
7.6573
(0.006)
3.6374 
(0.056) 
2.4258
(0.119)
a In parentheses are the t-statistics 
b F-statistic for null hypothesis that the coefficients on the regressors are zero (no cointegrating relationship) 
c Wald Statistic for null hypothesis that 21 ββ = (symmetric adjustment). P value in parentheses 
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Table 4: Estimates of error correction model  
(sample 1966Q1–2002Q1, quarterly) 
Asymmetric  
Symmetric
Threshold Momentum Momentum-consistent
Constant 0.0020538
(1.688)*
0.0014703
(0.891)
0.0022999 
(1.841)* 
0.0022620
(1.864)*
1)ln( −Δ tCEX  
a -0.18110
(-2.321)**
-0.18231
(-2.330)**
-0.18541 
(-2.370)** 
-0.16328
(-2.091)**
tylnΔ  a 0.23261(2.536)** 0.23299(2.534)** 0.23422 (2.551)** 0.22912(2.516)**
tPC )/ln(Δ   a 0.13006
(1.962)**
0.12746
(1.913)*
0.13454 
(2.022)** 
0.14045
(2.126)**
tEXNT )/ln(Δ   a -0.29074
(-4.530)**
-0.29148
(-4.528)**
-0.28849 
(-4.487)** 
-0.29946
(-4.686)**
tNlnΔ   a 1.2542(1.075) 1.1844(1.006) 1.1517 (0.981) 1.1730(1.012)
1−tu   a -0.18288(-3.545)**
 
1−ttuI   a -0.13319(-1.234)
-0.22895 
(-3.120)** 
-0.24152
(-3.949)**
1)1( −− tt uI   a -0.22069
(-2.488)**
-0.13984 
(-1.970)** 
-0.04842
(-0.525)
AIC 448.9954 448.1409 448.4071 449.6038
F b 8.1309 6.9720 7.0697 
 
7.5131
FA c 0.27520
(0.377)
0.78020 
(0.377) 
3.0733
(0.080)
a In parentheses are the t-statistics (** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level) 
b F-statistic for null hypothesis that the coefficients on the regressors are zero.  
c Wald Statistic for null hypothesis that coefficient on  equals the coefficient on . P value in 
parentheses 
1−ttUI 1)1( −− tt UI
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Table 5: Estimates of error correction model  
(sample 1966Q1–2002Q1, quarterly) 
Election cycle  Partisan 4 quarters 5 quarters 6 quarters 7 quarters 8 quarters 
Constant 0.0020761 
(1.694) 
0.0020128
(1.681)
0.0019752
(1.667)*
0.0019104
(1.605)
-0.0019019 
(1.576) 
-0.0019265
(1.587)
1)ln( −Δ tCEX  
a -0.12800 
(-1.906)* 
-0.14770
(-1.892)*
-0.15272
(-1.996)**
-0.15066
(-1.955)**
-0.15325 
(-1.953)** 
-0.16215
(-2.063)**
tylnΔ  a 0.23448 (2.537)** 0.24506(2.711)** 0.25690(2.866)** 0.25783(2.862)** 0.24850 (2.727)** 0.24165(2.642)**
tPC )/ln(Δ   a 0.12800 
(1.906)* 
0.12419
(1.903)*
0.12768
(1.980)**
0.14020
(2.161)**
0.13521 
(2.060)** 
0.13726
(2.076)**
tEXNT )/ln(Δ   a -0.28929 
(-4.467)** 
-0.29326
(-4.643)**
-0.30074
(-4.808)**
-0.30504
(-4.846)**
-0.30817 
(-4.805)** 
-0.30879
(-4.755)**
tNlnΔ   a 1.2620 (1.077) 1.4177(1.233) 1.4244(1.253) 1.3796(1.209) 1.2894 (1.116) 1.2814(1.103)
1−ttuI   a -0.19855 (-2.253)** 
-0.024895
(-0.296)
-0.011268
(-0.147)
-0.046614
(-0.658)
-0.097010 
(-1.447) 
-0.12213
(-1.885)*
1)1( −− tt uI   a -0.17448 
(-2.711)** 
-0.26892
(-4.302)**
-0.30168
(-4.690)**
-0.31375
(-4.515)**
-0.29418 
(-3.870)** 
-0.27893
(-3.449)**
AIC 448.4071 450.8786 452.4743 451.8545 450.0336 449.2346
F b 7.0697 
 
7.9935 8.6069 8.3671 7.6741 
 
7.3755
FA c 0.048285 
(0.826) 
5.5581
(0.018)
8.7304
(0.003)
7.4899
(0.006)
3.9061 
(0.048) 
2.3618
(0.124)
a In parentheses are the t-statistics (** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level) 
b F-statistic for null hypothesis that the coefficients on the regressors are zero 
c Wald Statistic for null hypothesis that coefficient on  equals the coefficient on . P value in 
parentheses 
1−ttUI 1)1( −− tt UI
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